[ETAN-key] JP by Kontras: TNI Reform: No More Business as Usual

[John M Miller]

The Jakarta Post

Friday, October 17, 2008

Op-Ed

TNI Reform: No More Business as Usual

by Usman Hamid and Syaiful Haq, Jakarta

In his remarks during the ceremony to mark the 63rd anniversary of 
the Indonesian Military (TNI) in Surabaya on Tuesday, TNI Chief Gen. 
Djoko Santoso reported briefly on the five-point implementation of 
TNI's internal reform agenda over the past 10 years:

TNI's neutrality in politics, the cessation of its involvement in 
business, the reform of the military tribunal, the improvement of 
soldiers' welfare and TNI professionalism.

Let us try to evaluate Gen. Djoko's report.

The success of TNI reform is a normative one. The implementation of 
reform has only gone a quarter of the way down the long road to 
genuine transformation.

It is still weighed down by the New Order paradigm, which is related 
to the 1960s domestic political struggle and the threat of communism 
within the context of the Cold War.

This is clearly reflected in various documents and facts found in the 
field, including the Defense White Book published in 2008. The 
dominant perception during the past 10 years is one that views the 
domestic sphere as the source of a security threat, a view that has 
hindered the transformation of the organization into a more professional one.

First of all, the success of eliminating the TNI's political role 
should not be measured by the revocation of the TNI's seats in the 
parliament (DPR). It also needs to be signified by the loss of 
military domination in the formulation of the state's political policies.

Although the TNI's presence in the parliament ceased in 2004, the 
stipulations in certain legal instruments such as the Law on the TNI 
and Law on the Truth and Reconciliation Committee show the strong 
influence the armed forces continue to wield.

In the Law on the TNI, for example, several of the TNI's old 
positions, such as the presence of territorial command (koter) and 
the "functionality" function, are still justified. The Law on the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which was expected to be a 
medium to resolve past human right violations within the framework of 
TNI's institutional reform, was found to be an example of a 
problematic political product and revoked by the Constitutional Court.

The TNI still maintains the Army's territorial command structure, 
such as Kodam (military regional command), Korem (military regiment 
command), Kodim (the military district command) and Babinsa (village 
guidance), whereas the 1998 reform demands the retraction of the 
military "dual function" and the removal of territorial command 
structure. The Armed Forces Faction in the parliament was abolished 
in 2004 but the territorial command remained.

This decision set the TNI further apart from its need to adjust to 
the global strategic environment, which has the prerequisite of 
attaining an ideal defense posture appropriate to the challenges of 
the 21st century.

This means that it should not be dependent on ground defense, but 
rather on a technology-based and integrated defense system between 
the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. This is the agenda to push for, 
because TNI reform needs to be directed by the more general agenda of 
security system reform, by setting up the National Defense Assembly 
(DPN), which has still not been established.

The DPN is crucial to synergize the whole security policy framework 
with the policies of other sectors in order to establish the welfare 
and well-being of the people. This is an agency that should be the 
medium for all actors to determine together the direction of the 
defense policy.

Second, the political regulation succeeded in prohibiting the TNI 
from engaging in business. However, during its implementation, the 
state was slow in taking over the TNI's businesses.

Amid the delayed implementation, the state has neglected to take 
action against ongoing business practices, and even failed to stop 
the transfer of the TNI's assets to private parties. There appears to 
be a large amount of the state's assets used by the TNI that have 
been misused for illegal objectives.

Third, the delay in amending the Law on the Military Tribunal has 
caused the low public accountability of the TNI before the law. TNI 
members and the former officers of the military still have access to 
special treatment when they are brought before the court.

Various forms of denial have been dealt with, whether by utilizing 
political history claims, gaps in laws or influence or power. This 
culture of impunity is hard to eliminate, and one of the causes is 
that the Law on Military Tribunal has never been revised.

In many cases, military tribunals are used as a mechanism to calm 
public protest without any guarantee for the delivery of justice. The 
process of promotion to strategic positions in the TNI does not give 
enough consideration to a person's human rights record. Thus impunity 
and military violence endure, which demonstrates the strong influence 
of the TNI on the national political stage.

Fourth, soldiers' welfare only serves as a political commodity to ask 
for an increase in the defense budget, even to legitimize illegal 
practices. The welfare of the soldiers has never been achieved 
because, since the beginning, there has never been any serious effort 
exerted on behalf of the government to achieve it.

The government submitted a draft bill on the TNI without inserting 
any stipulation on soldiers' welfare, even though that is a crucial 
consideration when one seeks to achieve professionalism within the 
TNI as the state's instrument for defense. The argument that TNI 
businesses would increase the capacity and welfare of the soldiers is 
a bifurcation of truth, because the profit has always been enjoyed by 
a few elites in the TNI.

Fifth, the TNI's professionalism can be built through the 
modernization of the weapon system's main instrument (alutsista). 
However, the development of state defense policy such as this will 
require a large budget.

The development of professionalism can be done by making the 
organization efficient, such as by eliminating territorial command, 
or by limiting the system to only the border areas and the outermost islands.

We appreciate all that has been achieved during the decade of TNI 
reform. However, to increase this to achieve thorough transformation 
of the TNI, the government and the parliament must act on the above 
mentioned issues. The main problem is the paradigm change in 
formulating the state defense strategic policies.

The writers work for the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims 
of Violence (Kontras).

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              Joyo Indonesia News Service

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