[mgj-discuss] Tin Wars in Bolivia

[Morrigan Phillips]

  Tin War in Bolivia: Conflict Between Miners Leaves 17 Dead
Written by April Howard and Benjamin Dangl
Tuesday, 10 October 2006

"Something that should have been a blessing for the country has been  
turned into a curse." - Bolivian Vice President, Alvaro García Linera

October 7th was supposed to be a day of celebration for the Virgin of  
Rosario, the patron saint of miners. Yet events in Huanuni delayed the  
festival interminably.

In place of the celebration, the archbishop presided over a mass for  
17 people killed in a two day conflict over access to tin mines. As an  
uneasy peace returned to the town, a nearby soccer  
field-turned-battlefield was still carved up by craters from dynamite  
explosions and stained red with the blood of miners.(1)

Only six days after two coca farmers were killed by soldiers sent to  
eradicate unauthorized coca crops in a remote national park in  
Cochabamba, seventeen miners in the town Huanuni are now dead after  
conflicts between mining organizations. This recent conflict has its  
roots in the exploitative history of the Bolivian mining industry, in  
revolution and nationalization, in privatization and the failure of  
neoliberalism.

The desperation that led the miners of Huanuni to turn their sticks of  
dynamite into weapons is the product of neoliberal policies that pit  
the poor against the poor. International corporations have siphoned  
the profits of Huanuni?s Posokoni hill, the richest tin mine in  
Bolivia, out of the country and into thin air. This physical and  
economic violence has been inherited by the administration of the new  
president Evo Morales.

Mining is a terrible job anywhere in the world. It?s particularly  
unhealthy and dangerous in Bolivia. The vast majority of miners are  
desperately poor, working in terrible conditions and with a life  
expectancy of 10 more years once they start working. The mines were  
nationalized in Bolivia in 1952 with the creation of the COMIBOL  
(Bolivian Mining Corporation) making all miners state employees. Since  
then, low world metal prices and the election of neoliberal presidents  
have led to the privatization of sections of the mining industry,  
giving rise to two distinct kinds of mining employment. Those who  
still work for the COMIBOL are unionized, "salaried workers" who  
receive a steady pay check and some minimal benefits. Other miners  
started or joined private ventures, called "cooperatives," though  
these businesses, like the COMIBOL unions, are extremely hierarchical.  
"Cooperativists" are either "associates" of the cooperative, employed  
by the cooperative, or are paid based on the amount and quality of ore  
they are able to mine on any given day. Cooperativists are dependent  
on the COMIBOL or private companies who buy their ore, but don?t have  
to pay them benefits. It was these two groups that battled each other  
in Huanuni, marking the most recent outbreak of violence in this  
volatile industry.

A History Underground

"If in the past it was the dictatorships that sowed mourning in the  
mining camps, today unemployment, marginalization and hereditary  
poverty of neoliberalism were the breeding ground for the  
confrontation between brothers for the possession of the rich deposits  
of the Posokoni hill." - Journalist with the Agencia Boliviana de  
Información (2)

After Spanish colonists emptied Bolivian hills like Potosí of most of  
their silver in the 1600?s, tin became king of Bolivian mines.  
According to historical accounts, Huanuni was called Kcoya Orco, or  
"Hill of the Mines" and was discovered in the 19th century. Local  
legend has it that its present name came from the intense cold in the  
area, capable of making stones break, leading to the Aymara name  
"wañuchi," which means "I have suffered," or "I've learned my lesson."  
(3)

During the 20th century, Huanuni was owned by Bolivia's all powerful  
tin baron, Simón I Patiño. Patiño rose from humble origins to one of  
the richest men in the world. By 1910, he was the owner of the most  
powerful mining complex, including the mines of Llallagua, Catavi,  
Siglo XX, Uncía y Hunauni.(4) The town of Huanuni, declared the Tin  
Capital of Bolivia, is about 50 kilometers from the city of Oruro, in  
the department of the same name. Within the 623 square kilometers of  
the town, in the pockets of the Posokoni hill, are the richest tin  
deposits in the country. The vast majority of the Huanuni?s 19,428  
residents depend on the mining industry for their day to day survival.  
Currently the exploitation of Huanuni is carried out by upwards of  
1,000 salaried miners from the COMIBOL, and 4,000 cooperative miners,  
300 of which are women.(5)

The unionized mine workers have played a notable role in the Bolivian  
workers movement. From the reign of Patiño and into the Revolution of  
1952, the union has fought for workers' rights, gaining an 8 hour work  
day in 1919, and the nationalization of the mines in 1952. The  
conflict which recently tore Huanuni apart has its roots in Bolivia?s  
Revolution of 1952. COMIBOL was founded in the heady days of this  
popular rebellion, when the mines were first put into the hands of the  
state.

The Revolution of 1952

The ascent to power of the Movement Toward Socialism, (MAS, the party  
of Evo Morales), which refers to itself as a "political instrument"  
for its social movement base, harkens back to the style in which  
revolutionary fervor among, workers, farmers and students was  
channeled through the Revolutionary National Movement (MNR) party,  
paving the way to the 1952 Revolution. Leading up to this revolution,  
the population united in its demands for better wages and working  
conditions, redistribution of land, nationalization of the mines and  
access to education and healthcare. The MNR party ran Victor Paz  
Estenssoro as their candidate for change in 1951. He won a clear  
victory, but the army intervened, placing General Hugo Ballivian in  
Estenssoro?s rightful place. The MNR knew taking power by force would  
be their only option.(6)

On the night of April 10, 1952, the army, with Ballivian at the helm,  
ordered all lights to be put out in La Paz in order to disorient the  
armed MNR rebels that were poised to attack. A full moon lit the  
terrain, providing a problem-free descent into the city from El Alto.  
After the fighting began, the MNR rebels quickly trapped the army by  
blocking key routes around and within the city. Uprisings against the  
illegitimate military government lit up around the country. In some  
cases, police and military joined the rebels or surrendered.(7) After  
three days of bloodshed left over six hundred dead, the MNR took  
control of the government.(8) Over fifty years later, after a  
significant weakening of the MNR platform, the arrival of miners in La  
Paz from other areas of the country would spark fear in the hearts of  
the elite and right wing politicians. With their helmets and sticks of  
dynamites, the miners continued to serve as a powerful symbol of  
rebellion in mobilizations for years to come.(9)

Estenssoro arrived in the El Alto airport from exile in Buenos Aires,  
Argentina on April 15th to a crowd of 7,000 people who waved placards  
saying "Nationalization of the mines," "Agrarian Reform," and  
"Welcome, father of the poor." The crowd was so large that it took  
Estenssoro thirty minutes to walk half a block to the presidential  
palace. He started his speech to the crowd in Aymara, the language  
most of the audience spoke: "Jacca t?anta uthjani" (There will be a  
lot of bread).(10) Three days after Estenssoro assumed power, the  
recently founded Bolivian Worker?s Center (COB), demanded that the MNR  
nationalize of the country?s mines without payment to owners,  
redistribute land to poor farmers, grant citizens universal suffrage,  
and formalize the armed worker and campesino militias to replace the  
military. Such demands coming from the COB and other worker and farmer  
movements pushed the MNR to make more radical changes quickly.(11)

On July 21, 1952, the government established the right to vote for  
everyone over the age of 21, bringing 80% of the population into the  
electorate. In spite of this hopeful, democracy was not truly  
established. Yet rights were gained none the less, in the way that  
Bolivians have often found most successful, through the pressuring of  
institutions from below. Campesinos and unions of rural workers, using  
their arms from the Revolution, applied their own systems of justice  
through militias, took over land, reorganized systems of production  
and often superceded the power of local political authorities.(12)  
This took place at the grassroots; the MNR was unwilling to enact such  
changes.

Due to pressure from their base of labor organizations and miners, the  
MNR signed a decree which nationalized the country?s mines on October  
31, 1952. An enormous crowd of miners gathered at the event to  
celebrate the signing with cheers, dynamite explosions and gun shots  
into the air. The festivities raged for days. The worker-run Bolivian  
Mining Corporation (COMIBOL).(13) took over the operation of 163 mines  
and 29,000 workers formerly controlled by Patino, Hochschild and  
Aramayo, the three mining baron families. In spite of the demands from  
the COB to not pay the owners a cent, the families were given $27  
million for their wealth underground.(14)

Meanwhile, pressure continued from below to radicalize the MNR  
government. Poor, armed campesinos in various parts of the country  
occupied land and pressured the government to break up large farms,  
expropriate and redistribute land.(15) As a result, the MNR passed the  
Agrarian Reform Law in August of 1953 which met these demands.  
However, on a national level the land reform only affected 28.5% of  
the large landowners. The MNR had been pressured by grassroots forces  
to make these drastic changes. As time went on, right wing elements  
within the MNR pushed these radical labor and agrarian groups -  
particularly the COB - out of the political sphere, co-opted and  
weakened social movements.(16) On May 14, 1953, Estenssoro applied  
policies pushed by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund  
(IMF), leading to inflation which tripled the cost of living in  
Bolivia. At the start of his third term, a military junta overthrew  
Estenssoro?s government, marking the beginning of military rule which  
continued off and on until 1982.(17)

Neoliberalism in Bolivia

In 1985, as poverty soared, wages dropped and the government was  
unable to pay its debt to the International Monetary Fund (IMF),  
Jeffrey Sachs, a Harvard Professor, drew up a plan to save Bolivia. A  
priority of his strategy was enabling Bolivia to continue making debt  
payments to the IMF. The plan, called decree 21060, included removing  
trade restrictions, freezing public sector wages and firing thousands  
of public employees.

The Bolivian government adopted the decree, a move applauded by the  
IMF, which subsequently gave Bolivia $57 million dollars in credit.  
The World Bank began lending money to the country again. Though the  
decree stabilized the economy for awhile, Bolivia?s poorest were hit  
hard with a rise in unemployment and lower wages. The move also hurt  
poor farmers as it directed investment and credit toward larger  
agricultural producers and lowered trade barriers to allow the  
importation of cheap agricultural products. The decree?s application  
resulted in a rise in unemployment which sent thousands to the  
informal sector as street vendors. At the same time, a drop in tin  
prices forced many mines to close, putting over 25,000 miners out of  
work.(18) Many migrated to El Alto or to the Chapare, where they could  
produce coca to survive. In this way, coca saved people from  
neoliberalism like a ship in a stormy sea.(19) The militancy of  
miners, exhibited clearly in the 1952 revolution, was transferred to  
El Alto and the Chapare. Their organizational skills were applied to  
assemblies, governance and unions.(20) The closure of the mines  
coincided with a boom in the demand from the US and Europe for  
cocaine. Coca quickly replaced the tin of Bolivia?s closed mines as  
the biggest exported product in the 1980s.(21)

In March 1994, President Sanchez de Lozada passed the Law of  
Capitalization which was supposed to boost GDP and save the country  
from its economic depression, but produced the opposite results. The  
law approved the sale of the country?s telephone company, airlines,  
trains, mining, oil and gas companies.(22) This term in office is best  
remembered by Bolivians as a period in which he privatized many state  
run industries, a policy he promised would spur growth. However, the  
wealth of these transactions helped out the small elite which Sanchez  
de Lozada was a part of, and never reached a majority of the poor  
populace. Instead of strengthening the economy, the country fell into  
a crisis. In an interview in 2001, Sanchez de Lozada described this  
first term in office: "Decree 21060 [Law of Capitalization] changed  
Bolivia from a state-run economy, a controlled command economy, to a  
market economy. When we did all of this, people were very upset,  
because we liberated all prices, all imports, and all exports,  
interest rates, exchange rates?We always kept the rhetoric to the left  
and the policies to the right."(23)

Unionists and Cooperativists

Huanuni miners were also affected by the economic crisis of the 1980s  
brought on by neoliberal policies. Though many miners migrated  
elsewhere with their families, some remained in the mines, forming  
independent cooperatives to work on their own. As prices recovered in  
the 1990s, some returned, forming powerful cooperative entities. The  
number of cooperative mine workers rose from 200 in 1995 to more than  
4,000 today.(24) This growth in workers - not matched by the COMIBOL -  
led the cooperative worker population to grow to 4 times that of the  
salaried workers of the Unionized Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers  
(FSTMB).

According to a recent study, more than 80% of Bolivian miners are now  
cooperativists, due mostly to the privatization of the industry. Until  
1980, the FENCOMIN contained approximately 17,000 miners. Recent  
estimates put the levels of cooperative miners in La Paz, Oruro,  
Potosí and Cochabamba at 63,000.(25) At Huanuni, members of the  
FENCOMIN is made up of the cooperatives of Playa Verde [Green Beach],  
La Salvadora [The Savior], K'arazapato [Salty Shoe] and Libres [The  
Free], who collectively form the Federation of Huanuni Mine  
Cooperatives [Federación de Cooperativas Mineras de Huanuni].(26) In  
the past few years, the FENCOMIN has maintained close relationships  
with presidential administrations, such as that of Sanchez de Lozada  
and, until recently, the new administration of Morales.(27)

The majority of the disputed Posokoni deposit in Huanuni was sold to  
Allied Deals PLC as the Empresa Minera Huanuni (EMH) in 2000 under the  
government of Sanchez de Losada for $501,123 dollars and the promise  
to invest 10.25 million dollars in the first two years of business.  
This kind of almost "no money down" deal was typical of privatization  
under Sanchez de Lozada.

Part of the mine was also owned by COMIBOL, the nationalized mining  
company, which Sanchez de Lozada couldn't completely destroy due to  
its inclusion in the Constitution. According to the La Paz based think  
tank Centro de estudios para el desarollo laboral y agrario (CEDLA)  
there were so many problems with this relationship, that at the end of  
December in 2001 Allied Deals PLC changed to RBG Resources PLC, an act  
which was not approved by COMIBOL, and which therefore broke the  
negotiated contract. Allied Deals/RBG did not make the investments it  
had promised to make, and on May 3, 2002, the West LB Bank in London  
intervened judicially to declare the company bankrupt due to fraud. In  
yet another sacking of Bolivia?s mines, Allied Deals declared  
bankruptcy, owing COMIBOL a whopping $94.97 million dollars.(28) Grant  
Thornton UK LLP (GT) was put in charge of the liquidation of the  
company in order to safe guard the rights of Allied Deals'  
creditors.(29)

Ten days after the fall of Allied Deals, COMIBOL sought legal  
intervention on their own behalf, and on November 15 of 2002 a civil  
court issued a resolution against Allied Deals for damages owed to  
COMIBOL. The resolution has gone nowhere, and the fraud motivated the  
COMIBOL to start an intense fight for the rights to the EMH itself, as  
the Mining Code states that the business must be sold to another  
investor. The movement pressured the neoliberal government of Jorge  
Quiroga into the creation of Law 2400, in July of 2002, which  
permitted COMIBOL to assume "the full and definitive direction and  
direct administration of the mining and metallurgical activities" of  
any deposit given to transnational mining companies under auction, and  
which have declared bankruptcy, committed fraud or have broken their  
agreed upon contracts. "In this way, this law 'perforates' the Mining  
Code and authorizes the nationalization of the Posokoni deposits,"  
states CEDLA.

In the same year of 2003, the price of metals in the international  
market, including tin, began to rise steeply due to growth in the  
Asian economy. The once deserted tin mines began to take on a new hue  
of desirability, which generated confrontations between salaried and  
cooperative workers who wanted more control of deposits in Oruro and  
La Paz. Unhappy with the levels of the mine given to them by COMIBOL,  
the cooperative workers saw their chance to take over Allied Deals'  
leavings.(30)

During this time, the FELCOMIN cooperative federation began to  
strengthen their position economically as well as politically,  
expanding their mining activities in places that didn't require large  
investments to explore. For this reason, the possibility of gaining  
control over the deposits owned by Allied Deals' Empresa Minera  
Huanuni in Oruro, as well as several mines in La Paz, became more  
attractive to them.(31)

On June 5, 2006, COMIBOL heightened pressure for the transfer of the  
EMH to their direction, backing up their claims with Law 2400, as no  
previous government had ever enacted the law. At the beginning of the  
year, FENCOMIN began their campaign to buy the EMH, and to pressure  
the government and incite their bases to take over the mines. On  
January 17, 2006, the Playa Verde Cooperative offered the intervening  
Grant Thornton and RBG $500,000 to sign a contract with the option of  
buying their shares. In February, negotiations took place in London  
between the Malcom Shierson, representative of Grant Thornton, and  
Severo Miranda Choqur, the president of the Playa Verde Cooperative,  
who was also representing the Nueva K'arazapato, Salvadora and Libres  
Cooperatives. Plans were discussed for the buying and selling of the  
shares that RBG had in Huanuni for a public price of $1.1 million  
dollars. According to the FENCOMIN, they have recently completed  
negotiations to buy the RBG's shares.(32) COMIBOL, the FSTMB and the  
Departmental Labor Center (COD) of Oruro have refused to even consider  
the idea, calling it unconstitutional due to Law 2400, as well as  
pointing to the debts still owed to COMIBOL by Allied Deals, as well  
as the transfer of the mine to the state.(33)

Osvaldo Guachalla H, an investigator of the Bolivian Observatory of  
Extractive Industries (OBIE), expressed his "surprise and indignation  
that the cooperative mining sector, which has been favored with  
minimal contributions to the state (they pay only 1% of rent and 1.8%  
in contribution to the National Health Bank, when everyone else pays  
10%, and they have a series of loan forgiveness plans) have the  
financial power to buy shares in the same high mercantile and  
capitalist style that they say they condemn."

A Time Bomb

The ore mined in Huanuni from the bowels of Posokoni produces  
approximately 10,000 fine metric tons of steel annually, a little less  
than half of Bolivian production and 5% of world production.(34)  
Current world market prices for tin amount to over seven dollars a  
pound, or six times the 2004 prices.(35) This rise in prices has also  
made ownership of the mines more valuable, and the relationship  
between competing mining factions more tense. Most workers for both  
sectors are poor, and corruption reigns at top levels. Due to the  
unstable profit and lack of capital of the cooperativist miners, their  
sector has received government support in terms of materials, reduced  
taxes and rent to COMIBOL. This has added to tensions between miners,  
especially as the possible benefits of the cooperativist gamble have  
risen with the price of tin.(36)

An inter-institutional technical commission claims that if the tin  
reserves in Posokoni are "rationally exploited" they could last as  
long as 30 years. Presently, the salaried miners of the COMIBOL, have  
set exploitation limits, while the cooperativists - whose daily  
existence is a gamble on whether they will find a productive tin vein  
- would like to have free reign. The COMIBOL leaders claim that, were  
the cooperativists in charge, the mine would be emptied in 2 years,  
leaving the town in poverty,(37) and subjecting miners to more  
dangerous conditions.(38)

The mine is divided into levels, and those levels are allotted to the  
different parties. Mining experts have sustained that in the deepest  
levels of the mine (-200 and below), which were owned by the Empresa  
Minera Huanuni of Allied Deals/RBG, exist deposits of tin and silver  
that could total over $580 million dollars in value.(39) With the  
materials and infrastructure owned by COMIBOL, the value of the mine  
cold total $620 million dollars.(40) These are the deposits that both  
sides would like to claim. Currently Comibol controls the deeper and  
richest parts of the mines: levels -120 to -320 ("Harrison" levels"),  
which salaried miners work with state invested in infrastructure,  
while the cooperativists mine the part closest to the surface,  
traditionally "Patiño" levels, starting at level 0 at the base of the  
hill and up, which do not require investments.(41)

In 1995, the FENCOMIN Huanuni signed a rent contract with COMIBOL in  
order to work some areas below the Patiño level and up, in order to  
form a fringe security level between the lower Harrison levels and the  
Patiño level. In July of 2002, this agreement was amplified to include  
levels down to -120, which caused problems between EMH COMIBOL workers  
and the cooperative workers, due to workers? preference for deeper  
levels where tin deposits are more pure.(42) To this day, salaried and  
cooperative workers have mined down to level -200. The cooperativists  
would like to expand mining down to level -320, where the richest and  
most pure tin deposits are located.(43)

Road to Huanuni

According to the Bolivian newspaper, La Razón, seven months ago the  
dispute in Huanuni fully began between the cooperativists and the  
salaried miners. To meet a resolution, the government arranged for  
both groups to work together in the mine.(44)

Many reports and interviews indicate that the situation in Huanuni was  
a "time bomb" which the Morales admininstration did not sufficiently  
pay attention to. The disputes between cooperativistas and salaried  
workers with COMIBOL had risen to a fevered pitch months ago, leading  
to numerous protests and road blockades among miners on both sides,  
demanding the government act. Both sectors have been supporters of the  
Morales administration.(45) However, through the month of September,  
both groups blockaded main highways to draw government attention to  
their demands. In both cases, Morales sent vice president Alvaro  
García Linera to accept the miners? petitions in order to end the  
blockades.(46) However, no solutions were achieved. Alfredo Aguilar,  
the leader of the Bolivian Miners Federation, said that throughout  
this time, the government?s position was "first come to an agreement  
between yourselves, and we?ll settle everything afterwards." Yet  
Aguilar admitted that they could never come to an agreement because  
the positions of the two groups were totally at odds with each other.

In the sixteen meetings held with government representatives since  
March, 2006 every proposal was rejected by one group or the other.  
"Both sectors (cooperativists and salaried workers) asked the  
government to leave them exclusively with the Posokoni hill, to  
exploit [the tin] for their own benefit. They also asked the  
government to use police and military force to favor their sector to  
the detriment of the other," said Vice President García Linera.(47) In  
a June 25 special edition of La Prensa, the paper warned of the  
growing conflict in Huanuni, and that the situation between the two  
groups could become violent.(48) According to García Linera, the  
government officials involved did not address the conflict in Huanuni  
more directly because they were busy working on revising the Mining  
Code, which would have settled the dispute.(49)

The conflict has played into the already divided politics of the  
miners and the country. Union groups said they had met with the  
executive branch demanding solutions and dialogue. The COMIBOL and the  
FSTMB accuse the government of favoring the cooperativists, even  
though COMIBOL is itself a state owned business. Some accused the  
Morales administration of ignoring the growing mining dispute due to  
other issues, primarily the challenges of the gas nationalization and  
the consituent assembly held in Sucre to re-write the Bolivian  
constitution.

Accusations have intensified since the appointment of Wálter  
Villarroel, a registered member of the Salvadora Cooperative, to the  
position of Minister of Mining.(50) Villarroel, who said that he  
worked together with both sides,(51) claims that it was "union leaders  
attached to PODEMOS [the main oppositional party], who are behind this  
conspiracy."(52) PODEMOS leader, Jorge Quiroga, blames the violence on  
what he calls the "aggression" of the Morales administration (53) The  
MAS government first reacted by blaming neoliberalism and poverty, and  
later blamed the obstinacy of the miners.

The Tin War: Two Days that Shook Bolivia

The recent conflict in Huanuni started at 2 pm on Wednesday, October  
4, when the cooperativists received a letter from the COMIBOL which  
declared the impossibility of transferring to them the shares of EMH,  
the mining company formally owned by Allied Deals. Ever Choque, a  
mining leader, says that the salaried workers received a note from the  
FENCOMIN 3:00 am Thursday morning stating that the cooperativists  
would take over the mine. At 3:30 am, Pedro Montes, the secretary of  
the Bolivian Worker?s Center (COB) got two phone calls alerting him of  
the cooperativists plans. He then informed the government.(54) At 8  
am, the cooperativists assembled midway up the Posokoni hill, near the  
sector known as Dolores. What happened next is contested by both  
sides. None the less, it initiated the most violent two days of the  
Morales administration.

According to Alfredo Aguilar, the president of the salaried workers,  
it was after the assembly that the cooperativists invaded the mine  
after destroying the offices of the EMH, as well as the national radio  
station, the church and houses of the salaried workers. According to  
radio journalist Wálter Cassia, it was close to 11 am when the  
cooperativists tried to close the offices of the business with  
dynamite. Choque sustains that the cooperativists started to advance,  
throwing sticks of dynamite. "We couldn?t stand there with our arms  
crossed, we had to react the same way," he said.

According to the cooperativists, however, their intention was to take  
over the mine "peacefully." Their strategy was to break the compressor  
that brings air into the mine, and thus force the miners who work the  
first shift to leave the deposits. The cooperativist director Santos  
Ramírez Yujra sustained that, at the end of the assembly, the workers  
decided to go back to work. "In that moment they were surrounded by  
salaried workers from the business, as well as their wives, commanded  
by the Army and the Police." Romírez says that the salaried workers  
advanced, shooting point blank against the cooperativists. According  
to the government, the soldiers stationed in Huanuni mobilized to  
avoid greater conflicts between both sectors. The government denies  
the presence of the military in the beginning of the conflict.

The exchange of dynamite lasted from 11 am to 2 pm, with the  
skirmishes reaching down to the main plaza of the town. The  
cooperativists posted themselves in the high part of Posokoni hill,  
above the Dolores neighborhood, and the salaried workers stayed below.  
According to one interviewed woman, more cooperativists came from  
other mines to join the fight with more dynamite while the army used  
only tear gas. The number of dead and wounded grew by the hour,  
including miners and residents of all ages.

During the confrontation, the residents of Huanuni gathered in the  
main plaza, at the church and the offices of EMH, demanding an end to  
the conflict. Schools and businesses closed, and some accounts told of  
fights between the wives of miners of both sides, while others said  
women grouped in the plaza waving white handkerchiefs and yelling  
"enough, we want peace." Children prayed for an end to the conflict in  
the church, teachers marched, demanding external intervention, and  
wives of salaried workers held a government worker hostage, demanding  
that she convince the government to send in the military to protect  
the business. Vice president Linera claimed that sending in the  
soldiers, known for being trigger happy in the face of angry mobs,  
would be like "throwing gasoline on the fire."

Most residents were simply terrified and stood watching the battle  
above. They called out to the miners as the two sides - sometimes no  
more than 50 meters apart - tossed sticks of dynamite at each other.  
The cooperativists, who were farther up the hill, filled tires with  
dynamite and ammonium nitrate, known as anfo (a chemical that  
increases the explosion), which they rolled down the hill toward the  
salaried workers.

The most critical moment came at 2 pm on Thursday, October 5, when a  
stick of dynamite hit one of the shops where cooperativist miners buy  
their explosives on the way into the mine. The explosion started a  
chain reaction, causing 39 other buildings to explode. The salaried  
miner Salustiano Zurita said the explosion was "like an atomic bomb."  
100 families were suddenly made homeless. Many had fled the area when  
the confrontation started, but two women died inside their houses.  
Quintín Calle (61), the husband of Teodora Ticona (60), spent the  
night searching though the rubble of his house with his eight sons. In  
the morning he walked down the hill to tell the FENCOMIN that he had  
found his wife. In reality, he had found a scrap of her skirt, pieces  
of her hair and skin, and a part of her spinal column. The explosion  
damaged EMH installations, radios, a hospital and clinic, as well as  
several other institutions. By the end of the day, 9 people were  
reported dead, and dozens wounded.

At 8 pm, the Defender of the People, the president of the Permanent  
Assembly of Human Rights, Waldo Albarracín, and the vice minister of  
the Interior Regime arrived in Huanuni. The delegation managed to call  
a meeting which lasted into the morning, but established a "pact of  
peace" signed by both sides. During the discussions, the sound of  
exploding dynamite echoed from the mountain where miners who were not  
aware of the meeting continued fighting.(55)

The "Pact of Peace" had four agreements, the first being the  
commitment to peace in respect for the victims and wounded, the second  
being a full and forensic investigation of the confrontation to  
determine those responsible for the violence, the third being to allow  
the peaceful burial of the dead, and the fourth being that, once peace  
was established, negotiations with government officials would begin to  
find a "definitive and effective" solution to the problem.(56)

However, in spite of the pact, the violence continued though the night  
and into the next morning of Friday, October 6. "Our role has been  
overruled. We had to leave," said the exasperated Defender of the  
People, explaining it was up to the government to reach a solution.  
The government finally announced that 700 policemen would be taken to  
the town from the city of Oruro. The policemen, who arrived at 11:45  
am, and were reportedly received with open arms by residents.

The police awaited orders in the patio of the EMH building into the  
afternoon while the violence continued. At 4 pm one group was sent to  
take control of Posokoni hill, with the orders of dispersing both  
sides without the use of force. Another group stayed in town, and a  
third group took charge of the EMH. Police told journalists that they  
would only use lethal force in self defense.

The presence of the police was apparently enough to convince the  
cooperativists to retreat, but it was the archbishop of Oruro,  
Cristóbal Bialasik, who convinced both sides to disarm. At 5 pm, a  
truce was declared for the weekend to bury the dead, which totalled 17  
from both days. The dynamite stopped, businesses opened, and a tense  
peace crept over the town. Huanuni was still very much divided, and in  
the community meeting held in the church, townspeople accused each  
other and threatened vengeance for the deaths. The police marched  
through the streets while the cooperativists and the salaried workers  
held wakes over their dead in the remains of their offices.

Reverse the Curse

While the truce arranged on Friday, October 6 seems as though it might  
hold, the conflict is far from over. $4 million dollars in damage from  
the battle has left citizens homeless and business owners  
destitute.(57) Morales has replaced cooperativist Mining Minister,  
Wálter Villarroel with ex-salaried worker leader José Guillermo  
Dalence, and Hugo Miranda Rendón replaced Hugo Molina as the head of  
the Bolivian Mining Coorporation COMIBOL. Unhappy with Villarroel?s  
removal in favor of a salaried leader, cooperativists have broken  
their ties with the Morales administration. Huanuni miners and  
residents are now not only demanding that the ownership of the mine be  
resolved, but they also want justice for those killed during the  
conflict. The next step in Huanuni must include a full investigation  
of the causes and instigators of the deaths and violence. Claims that  
snipers were involved, and that 7 out of 12 dead were killed by  
bullets of the same caliber used by the army must be verified or  
discredited.

Negotiations between the leaders of the salaried and cooperativist  
organizations that are mediated by government officials began on  
Monday, October 9 but have so far come to no conclusions. One possible  
resolution mentioned by President Morales is the re-nationalization of  
the mines, through the reactivation of COMIBOL, a solution harkening  
back to the Revolution of 1952, when the power of the bases brought  
about radical changes in the government and the nationalization of the  
mines. While the average worker might benefit from this plan, leaders  
among both the cooperativists and the salaried workers which would  
lose power or benefits through the action are likely to fight against  
nationalization. Furthermore, unless the Morales administration learns  
from its experience negotiating the nationalization of the gas and oil  
industry, nationalizing the mines could become a similarly complicated  
process.

The Morales administration could be faulted for a lack of constructive  
dialogue, but the conflict in Huanuni has much deeper roots. In a  
country recovering from an expansive neoliberal looting, many state as  
well as private, employees are left to fight over the scraps left by  
"bankrupt" international corporations. While nationalization is a  
popular solution, it is unclear if the government has the  
infrastructure and the capital needed to save many of these pillaged  
and abandoned industries. Nor should Bolivia be called upon to pay the  
debts of transnational corporations. It remains to be seen whether or  
not the new Evo Morales government will be able to rise above the  
rubble of Huanuni, reversing this curse of wealth.

***

April Howard is a history teacher and journalist currently living in  
Bolivia. Email April.m.howard(at)gmail.com. Benjamin Dangl took the  
photos in this article and is the author of "The Price of Fire:  
Resource Wars and Social Movements in Bolivia," forthcoming from AK  
Press in March, 2007. He edits TowardFreedom.com and  
UpsideDownWorld.org For more info on Dangl?s work and writing go to  
www.UpsideDownWorld.org/ben

Sources:

Photo of miners carrying dead from ElPeriodico.com

(1) "Los sectores mineros de Huanuni declaran una tregua." Especiales  
/ Guerra del estaño. La Razón. Oct. 7, 2006. "Bolivia deploys 700  
police to quell deadly miners' conflict." The Associated Press. Oct 5,  
2006.

(2) "Los mineros de Huanuni velan a sus caídos, la muerte tocó sus  
puertas." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6, 2006.

(3). "La gráfica." Especiales / Guerra del estaño. La Razón, Oct. 7, 2006.

(4) "Los mineros de Huanuni velan a sus caídos, la muerte tocó sus  
puertas." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6, 2006.

(5). "Respeto a límites de laboreo del cerro Posokoni es la base para  
la conciliación en Huanuni." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6,  
2006.

(6). Klein, Herbert. A Concise History of Bolivia, p. 206-208.

(7). Dunkerly, Rebelión en la Venas, p. 67-69.

(8). Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia, p. 206-208.

(9). In 2003, the arrival of the miners in the October gas conflict  
was pivotal in forcing President Sanchez de Lozada to leave the country.

(10). Dunkerly, Rebelión en la Venas, p. 67-69, 70-71.

(11) Solon, Pablo. La Otra Cara de la Historia, p. 27-29, 30-31

(12) Ibid. p. 32-36

(13) COMIBOL went on to produce more than 50% of Bolivia?s minerals in  
the early 1980s. Farthing and Kohl, Impasse in Bolivia, p.64. For more  
information on COMIBOL, see COMIBOL: Una Historia de Amor, by Salomón  
Rivas.

(14) Dunkerly, p. 88-89.

(15). Rivera Cusicanqui, Oprimidos Pero no Vencidos, p. 122-123

(16) Dunkerly. 104-106.  Solon. p. 39-42

(17). Solon, p. 32-38, 39-4.  Dunkerly. p. 91 ? 94

(18) Sanchez de Lozada?s privatization plan would come back to haunt  
his later administration in demands for state control of gas reserves.  
Duncan Green, Silent Revolution, p. 74.

(19) Stefanoni, Pablo. Evo Morales: de la coca al palacio, p. 46

(20) "Bolivia: Eradicate Coca-Cola." Sebastian Hacher; ZNet. Feb 5, 2003.

(21) Gill, Leslie. The School of the Americas, p.167-168.

(22) "Los Hidrocarburos en la historia de Bolivia," CEDLA. p. 21-24

(23) Interview with Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, PBS. Mar 20, 2001.

(24) "Lethal clashes between independent and state tin miners over the  
past day prompted the dismissal Friday of Minister of Mines Walter  
Villarroel." Martin Alipaz. EPA. Oct 7, 2006.

(25)?? Especial: Guerra del Estaño," La Razón. Oct. 7, 2006.

(26) "Posokoni es el reservorio de estaño más grande del país."  
Especiales / Guerra en Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

(27) "Villarroel entrega su cargo a los cooperativistas." Especiales /  
Guerra en Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

(28) "La Allied Deals adeuda $us 94 millones." Especiales / Guerra del  
estaño. La Razón. Oct. 7, 2006

(29) "La historia de Huanuni." CEDLA. Printed in: La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

(30) "La Allied Deals . . ."

(31). "El conflicto echó raíces desde hace siete meses." Especiales /  
Guerra en Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

(32). "La historia de Huanuni."

(33). "El conflicto echó raíces . . ."

(34). "Truce halts Bolivia mine violence." BBC News, Oct. 7, 2006.  
"Bolivia envía policías a convulsionado pueblo minero." Quintana, José  
Luis. Reuters. Oct 6, 2006.

(35). "Fresh clashes erupt in Bolivia after 12 killed over tin mine."  
AFP. Oct 6, 2006.

(36). ??Cooperativistas mineros privilegiados del Estado.?? El Diario.  
  Oct 6, 2006.

(37). "Dos grupos luchan por las riquezas del subsuelo." El Deber,  
Oct. 6, 2006.

(38) "Huanuni, bomba de tiempo advertida." La Prensa. Oct 6, 2006.

(39) "Destituyen a ministro Villarroel por enfrentamiento de mineros."  
El Diario. Oct. 7, 2006.

(40). "El valor de la mina es de $us 584 millones." Especiales /  
Guerra en Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

(41). "El boom minero dinamitó la paz social." Pablo Stefanoni,  
Página/12. Oct 8, 2006.

(42) "Respeto a límites de laboreo del cerro Posokoni es la base para  
la conciliación en Huanuni." Agencia Boliviana De Información. Oct 6,  
2006.

(43) "Posokoni es el reservorio . . ."

(44) Ibid.
(45) ??Denuncia corrupción en la Comibol.?? Los Tiempos. Feb 8, 2006.

(46) "Contiúan los enfrentamientos con dinamita." EFE. Published in:  
El Mundo. Oct. 6, 2006.

(47) "El Gobierno conocía hace meses del caso." Especiales / Guerra  
del estaño. La Razón. Oct 7, 2006.

(48) "Huanuni, bomba de tiempo advertida."

(49) "El conflicto echó raíces desde hace siete meses." Especiales /  
Guerra en Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

(50) Ibid.

(51) "Walter Villarroel acusa a sindicalistas." Agencia Boliviana de  
Información. Oct. 6, 2006.

(52)  "Fresh clashes erupt in Bolivia . . ."

(53) "El ministro de Minería se encuentra en la cuerda floja."  
Especial. Guerra en Huanuni. La Razón, Oct. 6, 2006.

(54) ??El ministro de mineria se encuentra en la cuerda floja.?? El  
Deber, 0ct 6, 2006.

(55) "La guerra del estaño estalló en Huanuni; hay al menos 9  
muertos." Especiales/Guerra Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

(56)  "La firma del "Acuerdo por la Paz" devuelve la calma de centro  
minero de Huanuni." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6, 2006.

(57) "La mina Huanuni perdió cuatro millones de dólares con la guerra  
del estaño, dice el Gobierno." RedBolivia.com. Oct. 10, 2006.

Works cited and consulted for the events of October 5-6 in Huanuni.


"700 policías ingresarán a Huanuni para evitar nuevos  
enfrentamientos." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct. 6, 2006.

"Acuerdan paz en Huanuni tras una luctuosa jornada." La Prensa. Oct 6, 2006.

"Las autopsias revelan que de 12 víctimas, 7 murieron por bala."  
Especiales / Guerra del estaño. La Razón. Oct 7, 2006.

"Bolivia envía policías a convulsionado pueblo minero." Quintana, José  
Luis. Reuters. Oct 6, 2006.

"Bolivia: violencia entre mineros." Vaca, Mery. BBC News. Oct. 6, 2006.

"Bronca y llanto entre los hombres y sus familiares." La Prensa. Oct 7, 2006.

"La cifra de muertos sube a 16 en el segundo día de enfrentamientos."  
Especiales / Guerra del estaño. La Razón. Oct 7, 2006.

"Cooperativistas y asalariados rechazaron tres propuestas y optaron  
por la violencia." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6, 2006.

"Dos grupos luchan por las riquezas del subsuelo." El Deber. Oct 6, 2006.

  "Los enfrentamientos dejaron miedo y destrucción en Huanuni."  
Especiales / Guerra del estaño. La Razón. Oct 7, 2006.

"Fiscalía investigará a francotiradores." Christian Peía y Lillo H. El  
Deber. Oct 8, 2006.

"Guerra del estaño" deja al menos 11 muertos y 57 heridos en Huanuni."  
Agencias. Opinión. Oct. 6, 2006.

"La guerra del estaño estalló en Huanuni; hay al menos 9 muertos."  
Especiales/Guerra Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

"En Huanuni hay más de 100 familias en la calle." Roberto Navia. El  
Deber. Oct 8, 2006.

"El ministro de Minería se encuentra en la cuerda floja." El Deber.  
0ct 6, 2006.

"Los mineros de Huanuni velan a sus caídos, la muerte tocó sus  
puertas." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6, 2006.

"Los mineros perdieron $us 250 mil durante el conflicto."  
Especiales/Guerra Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

"Morales elige a un asalariado y denuncia complot de los mineros."  
Especiales/Guerra Huanuni. La Razón. Oct 6, 2006.

"La muerte golpea otra vez a los mineros, el 21060 sigue cobrando  
vidas en Bolivia." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6, 2006.

"Obstinación de cooperativistas impide solución a conflicto de  
Huanuni." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6, 2006.

"La opción es reactivar Comibol." La Prensa. Oct 7, 2006.

"Policía controla centro minero y previene más enfrentamientos."  
Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 7, 2006.

"Respeto a límites de laboreo del cerro Posokoni es la base para la  
conciliación en Huanuni." Agencia Boliviana de Información. Oct 6, 2006.

"Los sectores mineros de Huanuni declaran una tregua." Especiales /  
Guerra del estaño La Razón. Oct 7, 2006.

"Vamos a defender nuestro Posokoni!" Indimedia Bolivia. Oct 6, 2006.

"Yacimientos de estaño en Huanuni." El Diario. Oct 6, 2006.